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By way of an Introduction:  These pages contain individual chapters from 
my 1990 book, Postmodern Sophistications. I have obtained the rights to 
the essays am making them available separately. The entire text of the 
book is also available on Research Gate.  
The underlying aim of this collection of essays was to question the 
opposition between the Sophists and Plato. That classic dispute has been 
the model for many discussions of tensions within our society:: on the 
one hand you have the clever manipulative salesmen who care nothing 
about truth. On the other hand the rigorous scientific investigation that 
never quite makes contact with politics. Rootless nihilism vs. naturally 
grounded values. Anarchy vs. Rules. 
In this book I developed a pragmatic middleground, using themes from 
Heidegger and Dewey; in later writings I rely more on Hegel. But the 
point remains the same: don't listen to the Straussians and others who try 
to force on our politics or art or philosophy a simple opposition between 
truth-loving traditionalists (Socrates) and flaky relativistic postmoderns 
(the Sophists). It was not so simple in Greece and it's not so simple today. 
Part of the book deals with postmodern critiques of rational knowledge, 
with Lyotard and Habermas on center stage. Their opposition between 
postmodern and modern views remains relevant, although post-1990 
developments in deconstruction and critical theory have widened and 
deepened the debate. The points made in these essays remain useful, if 
not complete. 
The second part of the book deals with architecture. The word 
postmodern has gone out of fashion in architecture. But the earlier use of 
the term for an attempt to bring substantive content into formal modernity 
retains important.   
My conclusions about postmodern architecture's failute to escape modern 
distance from history also remain true, as does my argument that that 
proclaimed modern distance from history is itself an illusion, that we are 
more embedded in history than the moderns wanted to think, although 
that embodiment is not as total and restrictive as we have imagined true 
of our ancestors. 
If you find any of these ideas useful, true, provocative, let me know. If you 
find them absurd or useless airy nothings, I'd still be delighted to learn 
from your reactions. 
David Kolb, January 2018
Charles A. Dana Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Bates College
davkolb@gmail.com, www.dkolb.org, mobile 547 868 4713
This essay asks how we can build on our historical grounding. 
Chapter 12. Self-identity and Place
How, especially in a world that names itself homeless, are we to create places for 
ourselves? Should we even try?
Buildings are not neutral containers; they shape the way we stand and move, the 
way we feel, the way time and space come to us. The dense reality of a building can affect 
us on more levels than our analyses provide. Often the building only repeats, or narrows, 
the forms and possibilities we already live. But architecture can offer us new ways to hold 
ourselves, to move and to be, and so criticize our current life by helping us feel how we 
might be differently.
The modern movement saw in this a chance for its buildings to focus the energy of 
a new age. Their masterworks still amaze us with the power they impart. Yet, caught in its 
own restrictions and in the homogeneity of the modern economy, the modern movement 
could not keep its promise. More and more, it reproduced everywhere one diminished set 
of possibilities. Postmodernism wanted to build freer places, but what has often resulted is 
an affirmation of one ironic meta-place.
In current discussions place does not mean merely a location with some 
functionally convenient structures. Place is where we feel at home in an articulated, 
legible pattern of locations and buildings that sustain and shape us by opening 
possibilities, supporting our forms of life, embodying priorities, and perhaps by expressing 
social ideals or cosmological patterns.
Discussions about place understandably tend to pit modernity against tradition. We 
imagine the past as filled with intensely local places each with its own unique character: 
European villages, small-town regional America. Modernism decreed that architecture 
would signify the uniform utopian life of the new age, and it continued industrial society's 
march toward rationalized homogeneity. Mass consumption and the dominance of 
exchange-value over use-value render it more efficient to make locations similar to one 
another, reducing their differences to surface decoration.
To reclaim a more human dwelling, perhaps here and there amid the landscape of 
consumption and efficiency there should be spots for centering and renewal that will keep 
us in touch with a history that goes beyond functionalism.[begin note]  Cf. the 
bibliography in Seamon 1987.[end note] A traditional home might furnish a refuge from 
the anonymous world, or a public building might embody communal aspirations and 
rekindle our idealism (cf. Moore, Allen, Lyndon 1974). Such a prescription stays within the 
modern project: people have a functional need for some special places, so planning 
should provide them. This is Weber's strategy of retreat: a rich domestic architecture 
provides a haven but cannot challenge the anonymous world outside.
Differentiated Places
Habermas notes that everyone in the current debates over place recognizes the 
problems we face.
[Modernist and postmodernist] agree in the critique of soulless "container" 
architecture, of the absence of a relationship with the environment and the solitary 
arrogance of the unarticulated office block, of the monstrous department stores, 
monumental universities and congress centers, of the lack of urbanity and the misanthropy 
of the satellite towns, of the heaps of speculative buildings . . . the mass production of 
pitch-roofed doghouses, the destruction of cities in the name of the automobile. (1985a, 
318)«IP»
The postmodernist sees these "atrocities" as consequences of modernism's basic 
stance; the modernist sees them as betrayals of the avant-garde spirit. Habermas counts 
himself among those who want to continue the unfinished projects of modern 
architecture.
He diagnoses the problem using the notions of system and lifeworld that I 
described in an earlier chapter. The lifeworld is that background of beliefs, values, and 
practice that provides a horizon of meaning for our actions. It is a cultural construct that 
must be renewed and handed along to provide community identity. Buildings embody and 
help form the distinctive practices and values of a community, and so they are one way of 
transmitting the lifeworld. But in our day the reproduction of the lifeworld has been 
dominated by imperatives stemming from the workings of the economic system. Lifeworld 
meanings are being thinned out, and so places become thinner as well.
In the ideal situation the reproduction of the lifeworld and the workings of the 
economic system would be distinct but would constrain each other. Community practices 
and values would put limits on the instrumental considerations of the system, and systemic 
restrictions would keep community practices truly practical. But in our world the influence 
has become one-way. The common lifeworld is ever more subject to considerations of 
instrumental efficiency, while the system is unconstrained by communal values and 
mutual decision procedures. More and more the act of building becomes determined only 
by systemic considerations of profit and efficiency.
There is, for Habermas, no architectural or design solution to this problem. It 
requires new institutions for community decision making, and a form of democratic social 
control of the economy that keeps the system from overwhelming the lifeworld. But even if 
we imagine such sweeping changes to have been accomplished, there would still be 
something different about modern places that would keep them from being equivalent to 
those old villages and towns.
Recall his emphasis on the differentiation of modern culture into independent 
spheres where art, law, and science develop free of outside influences. Habermas believes 
that we must preserve the expert status of art. Architecture "is subject, as is art in general, 
to the [modern] compulsion of attaining radical autonomy" (1985a, 323). At its best, the 
modern movement's ideal of functionalism was the coincidence of a shape that developed 
from the "inner logic" of pure form with a solution that met the building's program.
So, any cure for the problems of place today must preserve autonomy on several 
levels. We need to overcome the dominance of systemic forces on the lifeworld, so that 
the autonomy of community values and practices will be preserved, and places can 
reproduce a richer lifeworld. But we should avoid anti-modernists who ask for "a de-
differentiation of the architectural culture" (1985a, 318). We must allow the artist to have 
the autonomy to generate forms according to the independent logic of the art. (How this 
will result in connection with lifeworld values and practices Habermas does not say; here 
as elsewhere he is unclear about the way the expert spheres connect to everyday life.)
We also must safeguard the autonomy of the community in evaluating and 
changing its values and practices. This means that no place should impose a past upon us. 
Tradition cannot simply dictate how we build. Habermas has no use for nostalgic 
programs that prescribe covert returns to un-liberated modes of life.
Habermas poses the problem as a choice between undoing differentiation (and so 
moving back from modernity into a traditional culture) or accepting differentiation and 
working within it to complete the modern project. One reason it is crucial to maintain the 
independence of the expert spheres is that they provide a haven from which criticism can 
be launched against the systemic homogenization of life. But is it necessary to provide the 
spheres with their own independent inner logics for this to be possible? Especially in 
architecture it seems that many languages and games cross and intersect, and there is no 
process working under its own radically autonomous logic.
Earlier I argued that Habermas's notion of the lifeworld, which is meant to put us 
back into history, fails to do so because of the way the lifeworld is related to the universal 
project of self-criticism in his Socratic three-world story. Our inhabitation of our history is 
more spacious than his picture of traditional society, and we can criticize from within 
rather than invoke universal formal goals. But does this avoid the nostalgia he rightly 
criticizes?
Heidegger's Deep Places
Many thinkers influenced by Heidegger think of place not as an occasional 
refreshing center amid the wider world, but as itself a world. Heidegger pictures a net of 
places that support forms of life; these places "open a domain in gathering things which 
here belong together" (cf. Risser 1987). These are "things" (in Heidegger's special sense of 
that word) that call us to activities and open up modes of relating within a world or 
meaningful context of significance. He writes of the wine jug that in its use brings together 
a whole way of life with its practices, its past, its ideals, and its projects. He speaks of the 
place gathered by the bridge over the river that supports and calls together a differentiated 
world of town and country ways of living. He writes of the Greek temple that centers the 
life of the people while also allowing the natural environment to appear within a that 
context as something that transcends our human worlds. The jug, the bridge, and the 
temple are not neutral facts onto which meanings are projected. Rather they are 
encountered as gathering together a life that has no distanced standpoint outside the world 
called forth.
Rejecting the modern subject/object picture of meaning and activity, Heidegger 
argues that we should not conceive of the self as the source of some activity that reaches 
out to a world of neutral objects. Rather the self always already finds itself out amid a 
world of meaningful things, already in motion with goals amid a network of relations to 
other goals. There is no center from which a pure projection of meaning and value (or self-
criticism) could issue.
 In his post-war "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger claims that if we think of projects 
as posited by the individual subject (as a vorstellendes Setzen), we miss the point that it is 
being itself which "throws" our existence. ("Das Werfende im Entwerfen ist nicht der 
Mensch, sondern das Sein selbst, das den Menschen in die Ek-sistenz des Da-seins als sein 
Wesen Schickt. Dieses Geschick ereignet sich als die Lichtung des Seins, als welche es 
ist" [Heidegger 1946, 17, 25]). This precludes any Sartrean freedom in giving meaning to 
the world. But it also precludes the kind of self-active critical process described by 
Habermas. Heidegger acknowledges that it also affects his own critical project, and he 
makes complex maneuvers around this point, which prefigure the attempts of 
deconstructive writers to be both critical of and complicitous with the tradition. )Cf. 
Vattimo (1988) for a development of Heidegger's idea of Verwindung as a mode of critical 
relationship). 
This includes purposes as well as meanings. In rejecting the subject/object picture 
Heidegger also rejects the fact/value distinction. We do not encounter bland objects to 
which the self then attaches a value. There is no self except in the encounter with a world 
that already contains paths we are in the process of treading and tasks we are in the midst 
of doing.  Heidegger says that our projection of goals is neither prior to nor subsequent 
upon the projection of the world as a meaningful whole; these two are equally original 
(ebenso gleichursprünglich, Heidegger 1962, 141).
 We can never get behind the thrownness of the self to some purely individual 
project of meaning and purpose whose determination is totally the work of the self. Nor 
can we get behind such projects to pure neutral events set loose from all involvement in 
the network of meanings and purposes (Heidegger 1962, 284). The space (Spielraum) 
within which we move already has its own harmonies and structures.[begin note]  On this 
point Heidegger plays with the distinction between bestimmen and gestimmen. Our 
projects are given a determinate shape (bestimmt) as they are harmonized (gestimmt) with 
our world and with the meaning of being that provides the underlying theme of that world.
[end note] There is no moment of original constitution, no state of nature free of meaning 
and purpose, in which the naked individual or society chooses how to limit its original 
possibilities down to those of one culture or language.
Heidegger used the term "project" (Entwurf) in an attempt to describe the situation 
of the self as always flung out among things. The term is ambiguous because it could also 
signify that we fling out onto the world our subjective nets of meaning and values; this is 
just the opposite of what Heidegger intended. To emphasize that our projects are not 
completely our own he speaks of us as "thrown projects" (geworfene Entwürfe).[begin 
note]  "Any project -- and therefore also any 'creative' action of a human being -- is 
thrown, that is, determined by a un-controllable delivering of Dasein over to what already 
is as a whole." We can never get behind this "thrownness" to some pure construction of 
meaning and purpose whose determination is totally the work of the individual self or 
society.
This notion of a thrown project clarifies Heidegger claim that a real place would 
gather the world as a network of meanings and goals within which we find ourselves. It 
also helps us understand that when Heidegger speaks about "authenticity" he does not 
propose a return to a mythical state of subjective naked choice, but rather a resolute taking 
up for ourselves of the finite meanings and paths we find ourselves among.
Heidegger does not see the limitation inherent in authentic place as frustrating 
some drive towards unlimited possibilities. That would be to repeat the modern mistake. 
He speaks rather of the power of the rooted life that "thrives in the fertile ground of a 
homeland and mounts into the ether, into the far reaches of the heavens and the spirit," 
and he worries that everything will now "fall into the clutches of planning and calculation, 
of organization and automation" (1966, 49) as the ruthless efficiency of modern 
technological society levels all regions to a bland availability and devours their traditions.
We could not build just a few locations that would meet Heidegger's definition of 
place; we would have to change our whole life. But Heidegger thinks we cannot make 
that change. The overall meaning of our world is not something we can plan or 
manipulate, even though our modern world's meaning itself centers around the revelation 
of all things as available for planning and manipulation. Indeed, this is what has destroyed 
real places, but it is more our destiny than it is some error we can correct.
Heidegger dearly loved the rural culture of his region. Though he proposes no 
romantic escape from our technological world, he imagines that things might be different. 
In the past there were local places and gathered ways of life. In the future, when the 
technological world has run its course and new ways of life have been granted to us, real 
place may once again be possible. In dreaming of such a world Heidegger suggests that 
there would be little travel and no tourism there, because people would be at home in a 
sense no one can achieve today (Heidegger 1977, 127). Modern life's travel and media 
level all places out to a mute availability that makes everywhere equally distant while 
destroying real nearness. In true places our explorations would be in depth rather than 
wide travel. Such assertions come in part from Heidegger's provincial suspicion of the 
cosmopolitan world of the more established German intellectuals. But they also stem from 
Heidegger's claim that all possibilities are intrinsically limited.
The places Heidegger describes are intensely local; his examples are all contained 
within mountain valleys that provide natural limits and centers. Yet they encompass the 
whole life of their inhabitants. They are not domestic enclaves but whole, though 
qualitatively distinct, worlds.
Heidegger misses a crucial aspect of the modern problem of place and roots. It is 
wrong to contrast the rooted life with modern anonymity as if our options were either 
finding a single unified world in an Alpine valley or else losing all true place in a 
featureless spread of calculated locations. Ours is a world of many places that 
interpenetrate and shift and influence one another. We who talk about these things will 
never find a quiet deep-rooted valley with strong enough walls to make us forget that the 
world is wide. There may be people in actual valleys who do not think much about that 
wider world, but if we are partaking in the present conversation then we no longer live in 
such valleys. Too often today we encounter the ersatz valleys of narrow belief walled in by 
anger. The key to our escaping the non-place Heidegger fears is not a retreat to the lovely 
valleys but a pluralism without resentment.
The issue is multiplicity, even within single places, and what it would mean to make 
places in a multiple world. Meditation, not dialogue, marks the way of Heidegger's 
thinking. He always distrusted those who spoke too easily and broadly; for him dialogue 
was a sign of shallow thought. It was best to meditate silently, then pronounce 
authoritatively. Heidegger did not understand the need for travel and dialogue across 
places because his philosophical commitments forced him to evaluate the contemporary 
multiplicity of discourses as a degenerative rather than a creative condition. It could only 
mean that real places and things have been reduced to the status of objects to be 
manipulated. If we had things and places in his strong senses of those words, we would 
have a tradition and a world. Other things and other traditions there would be, and we 
would relate to them in various ways, but our own identity would remain firm.
It may sound strange to speak of Heidegger as defending "firm" identity. He is, after 
all, one of the originators of deconstruction, and for him there is no calm center to the self. 
We are never totally "in" any world or identity. But the disruption Heidegger finds within 
any identity lies in the way that identity is revealed; the "content" of the identity can be still 
quite unified. Heidegger felt quite able to make remarks about the deep identity and 
destiny of the Germans, or the national character and fate of the Americans or French. 
Heidegger's move is always to explore our roots in depth rather than encounter the Other.
According to the early Heidegger, to become authentic we must face up to our 
mortality and limits. When we become authentically resolved we take up our whole 
thrownness (our ganz Geworfenheit [Heidegger 1962, 382]). But this presupposes that our 
thrownness has enough unity to be taken up as a whole.
The simplest way of interpreting what Heidegger means would be to say that in 
becoming authentic we take up and ratify the whole formal structure of our thrownness. 
That is, we admit and resolutely accept the groundless historicity of our projects, whatever 
content they may have. Resolute authenticity would in this interpretation refer to how our 
thrown projects exist, not to their content.
But for Heidegger our thrownness includes something that is not purely formal, a 
particular understanding of being (Heidegger 1962, 221). Heidegger emphasizes the 
content of our projects. What we take up, says Heidegger, comes to us as a 
"heritage" (Erbe). Our past comes to us as a path for the future. Heidegger speaks of the 
world of meaning and projects already in motion as our "fate" (Schicksal). And it is clear 
that this heritage or fate has some unity. Indeed, he says it is only an aspect of the larger 
"destiny" (Geshick) of our time and generation; there is some task for our generation to do 
(cf. the reference to Dilthey in Heidegger 1962, 385, and the remarks in Heidegger 1971 
about inheritance and task).
This is not a simple historical determinism, for in authentic resolve we take up that 
destiny in a way that finds new meaning in its depths. That is the activity Heidegger calls 
"retrieve" (Wiederholung), whereby our thrown possibilities are taken up as possibilities for 
creative renewal.
Still, with such talk Heidegger moves very far from modern notions of free 
subjectivity. The problem has been highlighted by (but is not limited to) Heidegger's Nazi 
activities in the 1930s, which have been continuously controversial down to the present 
day. (Among recent publications, cf. Victor Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme (Paris: Verdier, 
1987); and the more definitive examination by Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs 
zur seiner Biographie (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988). Cf. also the suite of articles assembled in 
Critical Inquiry, Winter 1989 (vol. 15, no. 2), and the discussion by Thomas Sheehan, 
"Heidegger and the Nazis," New York Review of Books, vol. xxv, no. 10 (June 16, 1988), 
pp. 38-48.)
Does Heidegger's idea of destiny mean that the individual is fated to take up the 
cause of his Volk? Is the emphasis on the thrownness of our projects an affirmation of 
blood and soil? It certainly sounds that way in some of Heidegger's pronouncements in the 
1930's, where he describes the task of his generation and of the German people in terms 
resonant with National Socialist ideology. And in his silence afterward he seems to suggest 
that there is no way to judge that destiny. Later, Heidegger talked about the technological 
world as a fate that surrounds and directs all our projects.
To my mind Heidegger's notion of "thrown projects" is an important contribution to 
the overcoming of modern illusions. Heidegger's difficulties stem not from the notion itself 
but from the fact that he mistakes the unity appropriate to our projects. Talk of our Volk 
and our generation suggests a whole unified world already enfolding us. But need the 
world be so unified?
Heidegger would argue that our thrownness must be in some way a totality. He is 
willing to grant that our reflective conceptual account of the world does not need to be 
unified into some systematic whole such as philosophers have sought. But he demands 
that our pre-reflective active world have the unity of a single meaning of being. Any such 
understanding must be of "beings in totality" or "beings as a whole."
 He would claim as an understanding of the being of beings as a whole, our thrown 
project must affect all beings it discloses, and it must be unified, since a disclosed plurality 
of understandings of being would be contradictory; in which sense of being would they 
"be" a totality, or "be" at all?  But even granting that a project includes an understanding of 
the being of the entities that it lets stand revealed to us, why must we presume that those 
entities must include beings in totality?
Heidegger is making the Kantian presumption that all local languages and practices 
must have an inner skeleton of fully general categories and principles. But need this be the 
case? Perhaps language and practice are, as Wittgenstein would claim, a motley 
assemblage of local activities without any deep unity or general reach. Could not our pre-
reflective world be an interpenetration of many different understandings and projects, in 
the way that our ordinary language is a jumble of local theories and ontologies and 
projects? Nor need this multiplicity be gathered together in the background. To demand 
that it be so encountered is to demand too much unity from the self. Any presentation of 
the multiplicity as a whole would be in a subsequent act of reflection.
We can relate this to an earlier point. It is tempting to think of modern individuals 
as exemplifying a process that has its own build-in goals independent of all contingent 
content. Thus we might define individuals as preference or interest maximizers. The 
interests are the contingent material, while the process of maximizing is defined in a 
formal way that does not include any particular content.
But there is a hidden substantive commitment even here. Why maximizing? Why 
not minimizing our interests? Or satisficing? Or spurning them for creativity? 
Maximizing is chosen because it is presumed that the organism has needs and 
desires it wants to fulfill, not frustrate. This seemingly innocent biological or psychological 
presupposition hides the real issue. For wants and desires come already coded, and 
maximizing is just one operator within such codes. By the time we are sufficiently 
developed to be individuals, to be able to say our desires or choose our projects, we are 
already strung on language and culture. There are no naked desires; it is always too late for 
that. But does not mean that there is one deep language that structures all our desires.
If there is no final language before or behind the multiplicity, then we should not be 
seeking with Heidegger for some unified secret sense of our age, or for nostalgic places 
where we can finally be at home. Our task is, as Nietzsche says, to "give style" to our 
character and to our places, style that does not come from some necessary deep unity so 
much as from openness and a willingness to take up the possibilities we are thrown 
among in a way more multiple than Heidegger would approve.
This would mean toning down the seductive "history of being" in Heidegger's later 
thought. The descriptions of the various epochs of that history become at most heuristic 
guides to tangled situations. In particular we should mistrust Heidegger's seductive 
analysis of technology and Gestell as "the essence" of modernity.
  The question about modernity's universal perspective becomes the question 
whether we can have a formal and universal language that can embody a set of pure goals 
above any historical project. Originally this pure language was proposed to house 
metaphysical systems; lately it has been proposed (especially by Habermas) for self-
criticism. Critiques of the ideal of a pure language abound today; I will not rehearse them 
here. What I want to stress is that these critiques have as a consequence that all our 
projects, even our projects for self-criticism, are "thrown projects" rather than pure self-
activity.
Empirical Places
Thinkers influenced by Marx share Heidegger's distrust of contemporary culture, 
but diagnose the problem in a much more empirical way. They argue that the postmodern 
world has a material base that Heidegger and his followers need to take more seriously (cf. 
Foster 1983 and Jameson 1983 and 1985). Place is not being destroyed by a destiny of 
being, nor by the metaphysical search for security and selfhood, but by the socio-
economic facts of life. The international flow of capital, the loss of control over national 
and regional markets, the commoditization of architectural use-value, these are what 
doom any attempt to stabilize places today.
At its most pessimistic, with Manfredo Tafuri (1976; 1987), this line of thought leads 
to the conclusion that the architect can do nothing to influence the overall system. While 
Le Corbusier could offer architecture as a way to accomplish the goals of revolution, for 
Tafuri there will be no architecture until after the revolution. A slightly less pessimistic 
Frederic Jameson and Kenneth Frampton see the possibility for architects to keep alive the 
ideal of place as a sign of resistance.
Lyotard deals very differently than Frampton or Jameson with the problem of local 
places (1984; 1986). He certainly opposes the rule of flowing capital that turns all our 
language games into strategies of exchange. But the postmodern condition is not just due 
to the flow of capital erasing local places. It is a semiotic condition, a universal circulation 
of signifiers released from the myth of a direct relation to the signified. Chains of signifiers 
float and interpenetrate; firm identities are myths; neither the self nor society has enough 
consistency to build a stable place. Any attempt to hold on to a rigid system of 
signification can be a form of terrorism.
For Lyotard the flow of capital actually restricts postmodern flexibility. Capital 
introduces its own terror as it reduces the flow of signs to the simple exchange of 
performance and profit. The cure is not to further restrict the flow by making solid local 
places, but to widen it with new language games that challenge what has been established 
and present new forms and phrases that cannot be translated into the common coin of 
information exchange, at least for a time. In doing so we reinvent ourselves. This is similar 
to and follows the same stages as the metaphorical transformation of language that I 
described earlier, though Lyotard stresses discontinuity and independence where I stress 
affiliation and intersection.
I argued above that Heidegger burdens his discussion of place with undue 
emphasis on unity and totality. There is a similar danger when critics speak about our 
being dominated by the system and flow of late capitalism. This can sound like 
modernism's universal force of rationalization that was to have overwhelmed all historical 
styles. We are no longer so convinced that modernism made history vanish; perhaps we 
should be slow to believe that capital is already universally dominant. Is this the only way 
we are to describe our situation? Must we characterize everything in terms of its 
subservience or resistance to that flow? Why should we assume that the deepest 
description of our lives is that of the financial or cognitive masters? Why not assume that 
the natives might be in touch with their own situation? Certainly, we cannot deny the 
pressure on local places. That it completely dominates may be a fantasy of totality, a 
fantasy which has been strengthened by the modernist concepts we tend to use to describe 
our situation.
Adorno and Horkheimer's apocalyptic despair has become popular again today, 
but Habermas seems to me correct in his conclusion that our problems stem from a 
pressure upon the lifeworld rather than a complete victory for the impersonal imperatives 
of system flow and efficiency. I criticized Habermas for the purely formal goals contained 
in his three-world story, and tried to suggest ways in which his attempt to broaden the 
notion of rationality could be widened even further, but his overall picture of system and 
lifeworld seems more useful than the dramatic totalizations in much postmodern thought. I 
take up these issues again in the section on consumer culture in the final chapter.
Deconstructed Places
If we are not imperial rationalists, nor Heidegger's rooted peasants, nor easy 
ironists, what kind of place can we make for ourselves? Neither the moderns nor most 
postmoderns challenge the goal of making places that express our identity. But should we 
even try to be "at home"?
For Derrida and others the desire to be at home in a place is an attempt to close the 
gap between us and some centering values and ways of life, as if we could overcome the 
distantiations and divergencies that make it possible for us to have a way of life at all. 
There is no way to embody the center, which is always deferred; the indwelling center has 
always no longer been where it was supposed to be. The unity of dwelling always escapes 
us; like any structure of thought or language, a built place contains the movement of its 
own deconstruction. Architecture should make this manifest by using the local language to 
show how it never fully comes together.
We should, in this view, give up the picture of buildings as something in which an 
individual or a community can represent itself to itself. Our attempts to be at home are 
made possible, and ultimately frustrated, by the labile non-presence of the building "in 
itself." Peter Eisenman attempted to design a house that showed this. His House X dealt 
with problems of centering and multiple readings as he deconstructed the purist language 
of his own earlier plans. The line between this and the ironic postmodern mode can be 
hard to find, but House X, which is full of complex inner relations and references that 
frustrate one another as they allow multiple readings and pit standard unities against one 
another while none of them achieve totality, is not an exercise in ironic historicism.
Eisenman's task was made simpler because the purist language he chose to 
deconstruct already contained explicit centering principles that made wonderful targets. It 
is less clear how the deconstructive gesture would be accomplished with a fuller and more 
ambiguous historical vocabulary, but there is no reason to think it could not be done.
Yet if it were done, such buildings would lose their point if there were very many of 
them. They need contrast with an accepted language; if a deconstructive mode itself 
became the accepted language, the buildings would lose their inner tension. Turned into 
architectural vernaculars that could fill the fabric of our cities, such buildings would no 
longer work as they were intended(!) to do. Deconstruction does not allow us to make 
places but only to dance on the borders of the almost-places we have. All places have 
borders even in their centers, and the deconstructive task is to find those borders and the 
ways in which our constructions cross them while denying that they do.
If all unified places maintain their limits because in marginal ways they enact their 
own decentering and self-transgression, this is a permanent condition of all places. But it 
does not mean that we cannot have effective places to the extent that they are possible. 
And for the play of deconstruction to work, they have to be possible. Marginality demands 
pages. If there were no text to deconstruct then either the deconstructive architecture 
would become empty irony or it would collapse into a new orthodoxy. In either case there 
would be a new metaphysical text and the deconstructive task would begin anew.
But if they remain deliberately marginal and play against the mass of others, 
deconstructive buildings could have a pivotal role. Instead of extending architectural 
vocabularies, as I have urged for ordinary buildings, deconstructive architecture could 
demonstrate the limits of any vocabulary and the ways our vocabularies are implicated in 
wider codes and systems. There is a sense in which every building does this, but the city 
would be helped if some did it explicitly.
There is a tendency to run together deconstructive criticism with the critique of late 
capitalist society. This is useful but dangerous, for it can turn the delicacy of deconstructive 
operations into a blunt instrument of totality. Homelessness, transgression, decenterdness 
and the like become reified as tools with which to oppose current trends. Deconstruction 
is not a theory which reveals some hidden level of forces waiting to be enlisted on our 
behalf. It can free us for more creative gestures and resistances, but it does not by itself 
take a stand on the issues of the day. To think it does is to change it into haughty irony and 
hidden totality.
Too much discussion about place presumes a single identity for each self or 
community. That identity is to be expressed in a place, or to be overwhelmed by some 
universal flow. But if our identities are not single-ply, if tradition is not a simple immediate 
given, then a livable place may not be a matter of dogged resistance. Frampton is right 
when he says that our universal civilization and our local cultures must qualify each other 
(1983). But how are we to find in the local culture projects and forms of life that can help 
define places? The next chapter discusses what we might find in ourselves and our 
communities to guide our building.
